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Introduction 
  Legitimacy refers to the justification and acceptability by individuals of public power or authority. 
Legitimacy, in modern Western States, is based on the existence of entitlements for individuals 
participation in public life; these entitlements together with the concomitant duties form a status 
designed as citizenship. The creation of the citizenship of the Union was rooted in an effort to increase 
democratic legitimacy and, in the work of some authors, thereseem to be an implicit agreement that the 
common practice of citizenship rights could become the basis for the development of a positive 
solidarity that might generate an independent source of legitimacy for the EU. Some authors refer to 
the modest process of creating a culture of rights,1 whilst Habermas has argued that a similar 
development, the creation of constitutional patriotism, happened in Germany to fill the vacuum left by 
the excesses of German nationalism under the nazism. May the common practice of citizenship 
rightslegitimate (i.e. be the basis of acceptance of) Union policies? There is, then, a second question: 
can European constitutional patriotism (justify/give way) to reliquinshing immediate individual 
national interests in favour of collective European goals?2 
  This paper explores whether the citizenship of the Union may become an autonomous source for 
Union legitimacy by focussing on two issues. Firstly, it seems that some Union citizenship rights, 
particularly the rights to freely move and reside within the EU, do establish legitimacy basis for the EU. 
That is, the praxis of such rights may create a substrate of acceptance of European Union. Political 
rights, though, are the essential citizenship right therefore it is necessary to determine to which extent 
the political participation afforded by ELcitizenship establishes a legitimacy channel autonomous from 
nationality. On the catalogue of rights included by the Treaty on European Union, the legitimacy 
deficit in the concept and implementing elements of political rights created by their reliance on 
nationality will be examined (II). Secondly, the difficulties to develop social rights or redistributive 
entitlements, on the other hand, mean that citizenship of the Union will not substitute the individuals 
perception of material belonging around nationality (III). In either case, it seems evident that the 
traditional attachement of citizenship (as a status of rights) to the idea of nation provides legitimacy 
grounds for the development of certain rights which constitute the essence of citizenship. If citizenship 
is built up as a set of rights without no reference to the community identity contained in the idea of 
nationality, there will be a lack of legitimacy to include certain rights. Anticipating the conclusion (IV), 
a concept of citizenship that goes further than the mere harmonization of certain secondary political 
rights seems to require the previous development of forms of pan-Union identity if it is to avoid 
legitimacy deficits. The reasoning will comence establishing a conceptual difference between 
citizenship and nation as two different ways of relating individuals to public power in their legitimacy 
function (I). 
 
I. ESTABLISHING A CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP AND NATION 
Although in the frame of contemporary nation-states citizenship and nationality appear indissolubly 
linked, both concepts convey different ideas on the role of individuals in legitimasing public power. 
The concept of nationality refers, etiologically, to an undetermined attribute of a person generally 
assigned at birth: the concept derives from the Latin nascere (to be born). Natio referred to peoples and tribes not yet organised in political assotiations, implying merely procedence.3 The concept of nation 
sanctioned, thus,continuity with a determined lineage as well as a geographical entity in which this 
lineage was established. Following Habermas, nations may be defined as communities of people of the 
same descent, who are integrated geographically in the form of settlements orneighbourhoods and 
culturally by their common language, customs and traditions, but who are not yet politically integrated 
in the form of state organization.4 The attachement to a legitimasing function is closely linked to its 
perception as a new and alternative political subject in opposition to the king or queen as the bearer of 
national sovereignty. Since nations referred also to a lineage, the perception of the political subject was 
developed in a trascendent dimension which allowed to establish identity across time independently of 
the concrete individuals forming the nationa in a given moment. The fundamental continuity 
andidentity through time was established as the basic characteristic of the nation and, then, nationality 
expressed the link with a political community (in most of the cases, the bearer of sovereignty) before 
other political communities. Trascendence and differentiation are the basic characteristics of the nation 
as well as the foundation of the legitimacy of representative public power. The concept of citizenship 
emphasises the existence of entitlements for individuals as the foundation of their legitimasing role. In 
the Roman Republic as well as the Roman Empire, citizenship meant the personal status of certain 
individuals, which was characterizedby property ownership and, consequently, full participation in 
public life through positive fights. When cities became an alternative model of political organization to 
feudal, imperial or royal dominance, they were perceived furthermore as the source of individual 
freedoms. After the French Revolution, the concept of citizenship was constructed around Rousseau's 
notion of self-determination, primarily in developing the principle of the equality of individuals. In 
words of Habermas again, everyone should be in a position to expect that all will receive equal 
protection and consideration in his or her inviolable integrity as a unique individual, as a member of an 
ethnic or cultural group and as a citizen, that is, as a member of a polity.5 Equality of legal status 
seems to be an agreed characteristic of citizenship; along this line, Meehan argues that the basic 
element of citizenship from which capacities for full participation arise is to live under the rule of law, 
under a system where laws and offences are known, where there is predictability and certainty that 
offences will be punished but that punishment for breaches can follow only from the application of the 
due processes of law.6 Differently from the term nation, citizenship referred primarily to a personal 
status made up of entitlements, rights and duties. The classical account of the process of creation of 
modem citizenship is that of Marshall who established that the personal status results from 
accumulating three successive levels of fights. The first group are civic fights expressing the basic 
legal equality of individuals before the law. Secondly, political fights entitle the individual to 
participate in the exercise of national sovereignty. Finally, social fights marked the final stage of 
development of citizenship, although nowadays there has been some contention on Marshall's account. 
The blending of the analytically different legitimacy functions attached to the terms nation and 
citizenship must be established around the doctrine of national sovereignty. The sovereignty of king, 
queen or emperor was not dependent on the existence of a communitys and individuals were subjects 
who owed alliegance to the sovereign (who, in turn, owed them protection). When the nation became 
the source of state sovereignty it was necessary to determine the individuals entitled to participate in 
the political life and their new status. The nation-state provided the frame for free individual and 
collective action.7 Therefore, there is a symbiosis, as Habermas argues, between republicanism and 
nationalism. The new political role of individuals demanded a high degree of personal commitment, 
even to the point of self-sacrifice and, at this juncture, nationalism served to foster people's 
identification with this role: nationalism and republicanism combined in the necessity to fight and, if 
necessary, to die for one's country,8 instead of the obligation to die for the king. 
Both concepts converge on a criterion of exclusion. Characteristically, the exclusion established by the 
concept of citizenship is within the community, the excluded individuals being determined by 
ethnicity9 or gender.10 A parallel essential feature of citizenship has been a sense of being able to 
distinguish between "ourselves" and "others" from outside our community, whatever the territorial 
dimension of that community. With the need for emergent nationstates to control borders, the 
distinguishing characteristic became nationality.11 The exclusion was founded on the understanding of 
the state as an entity whose telos is to express the will and further the interests of distinctive and 
bounded nations, and whose legitimacy depends on their doing so, or at least seeming to do so.12 Thus, 
the conceptual identity between nationality and citizenship has been the result of an historical process 
of construction, concluding with the exclusion of certain categories of individuals from this privileged status. From a juridical point of view, both concepts of nationality and citizenship refer to the 
relationship of the individual with the state, although the significance given to either concept seems to 
depend on the historical traditions pertinent to each state. It could be argued that in its most common 
usage, citizenship has a juridical constitutional meaning ad intra of the political community whilst 
nationality has a international juridical meaning ad extra of the said community.13 In this perception, 
nationality means the affiliation of an individual from the point of view of international law, whilst 
citizenship implies the host of domestic rights attached to that affiliation. The logicalsequence is that 
nationality implies citizenship and this, in turn, implies a host of rights and, consequently, exclusion 
from nationality would imply, in conceptual terms, exclusion from the rights of citizenship. 
Despite of the convergence of both concepts, citizenship and nationality, there is a telling psycological 
differences among them. Nationality establishes identity of a political subject across historical time. 
This implies the possibility of an individual to identify himself with other nationals independently of 
their respective historical times. Citizenship, on the other hand, emphazises personal autonomy of 
individuals14 and marks the change in individual status across time. Regardless Aaron opinion that 
multinational citizenship was not possible, this difference between status and identity has allowed the 
creation of Union citizenship. However, the split between both marks also the limits to the legitimating 
function for Union citizenship. The legitimacy function for EU citizenship will be established along 
Weiler's dual definition.15 Weiler has distinguished two different concepts of legitimacy: formal (or 
legal) and social (or empifical). Formal legitimacy implies that all requirements of law are observed in 
the creation and functioning of the institution or system. Formal legitimacy distinguishes itself from 
legality because the first involves people's consent; any notion of legitimacy must rest on some 
democratic foundation even if this is as vagely defined as the people's consent to power structures and 
processes. Formal legitimacy in the EU has two traditional sources; direct and indirect. Since 
citizenship of the Union attempts to establish a direct link between individuals and Union, it must be 
assessed whether Union citizenship improves formal direct Union legitimacy. Social legitimacy, on the 
other hand, connotes a broad societal (empirically determined) acceptance of the system. In Weiler's 
view, an institution may be socially legitimate even if broad sections of society do not favour its 
specific composition, programme or operation. Of course, social legitimacy implies mesurement of 
public opinion; this paper will focus rather on whether Union citizenship alters the background 
conditions on which public opinion is constructed by referring to an essential element of citizenship: 
social redistributive fights. In this case, the lack of a national substrate sets some serious limitations to 
the expanding of the status citizenship to include certain essential rights. 
 
II. The legitimasing effect of the practice of political rights 
The legitimasing effect of the practice of political rights enshrined by the Maastricht Treaty is limited. 
Traditionally, CE legitimacy has been said to be dual: direct, as provided by a directly elected EP, and 
indirect, as provided by the Council made up of representatives of national governments. The 
prevalence of the indirect source is established not only by the EC decision-making procedures but it is 
furthermore reinforced by the subordination of political participation by Union citizens to national 
requirements. More significantly, the political rights of Union citizenship do not seem to create the 
basis for the development of constitutional patriotism (as different to nationalism): they do not entail 
the possibility to participate in political decision-making either pertaining national sovereignty or 
Union policies at the most decisive level. 
 
1. Neutralisation of dilution of national identity in political rights of EU citizenship 
The prospects for EU citizenship becoming a direct EU legitimacy source is severely burdened because 
the indirect attribution of Union citizenship implies denying an immediate link between citizenship and 
Union. As a consequence, the exercise of Union rights is conditional upon being a national of a 
Member State. But even the two rights to political participation expressely included are not unlimited 
since certain restrictions in the exercise of these rights protect national identities. 
Precisely, the granting of voting rights in EP but specially in local elections, is made upon the 
assumption that these do not affect national sovereignty and therefore, national identity is no affected 
by them. The exercise of voting rights in the Member State ofresidence is optional: citizens may 
choose to vote either in their Member State of nationality or residence. This seems to be an 
acknowledgement that the nationality link to be a stronger and more persistent one than the link with 
the host country created by Union citizenship. The practical effects of the generalisation of voting fights for EP elections seem to be reduced in terms of electoral impact. However, where a threat to 
national identities has been perceived (i.e. Luxembourg), careful arrangements have been made to 
prevent dilution of national identity. 
 
2. Prevalence of nationality in the establishment of the political relationship between individuals and 
the EU 
Political participation is the key instrumental political act by citizens in a democracy. Union 
Citizenship fights do not include a general fight to political participation in the Union. Specifically, the 
modalities of political participation afforded by Union citizenship do not provide the capabilities to 
influence the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take, what Verba et al 
consider the essence of political participation. The modalities that do have the most important impact 
on Union politics because of its constitutional and institutional framework are not included as Union 
citizenship fights. By preserving these mechanisms from Union citizenship, national identities are 
reinforced by the possibility of not being superseeded by the direct relationship between individuals 
and Union. 
 
a. Participation in national elections 
Given the overwhelming prevalence of the Council in EU decision-making processes, the most 
important citizens decision on Union politics is through the election of nationalgovernments, what is 
generally termed indirect legitimacy. Most Member States still reserve participation in national 
elections for their own nationals, since this is the mechanism to actualise national sovereignty. 
Reserving the participaction for own nationals provides amechanism for reconstructing cohesive 
national identities to participate in EU politics. 
 
b. Exclusion of forms of direct participation (contracting out) 
The input of direct legitimacy into the EU political system relies solely in EP direct elections: there is 
no other mechanism for non-mediate citizens political participation in EU politics. The exclusive 
initiative right granted to the Commission percludes people's initiative and referendums are, simply, 
nor even referred to in preparatory drafts on Union citizenship. Of course, there is no agreement on the 
legitimising effect of the forms of direct participation or whether they are compatible with 
representative democracy. 
However, national mediation does allow forms of direct participation on EU affairs. Hypothetically, a 
government might pick citizens initiative in these cases in which the Council may suggest the 
Commission to initiate legislation, although practical and constitutional limitations may impede it. 
National referendums provide a real mechanism for citizens political participation in restricted cases. 
Given the impossibility of selective derogation of EU legislation, the recourse to the instrument of 
direct participation is reduced to constitutional decisions on membership and reform. 
In either case, EU citizenship does not offer an alternative status to legitimate EU politics. National 
referendums are considered to be a form of expression of national sovereignty and, consequently, 
participation in the decision-making is reserved to nationals. 
The real political effects of this exclusivity are difficult to interpretate: Quoting the small difference in 
votes in the French and Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty, 
Koslowski has noticed that the enfranchisement of EU citizens for referendums could affect the 
seccession possibilities of a member state. This assertion has difficult proof. The political significance 
of non-enfranchisement of EU citizens for referendums in these coutries in whichthey are required has 
the general effect of sanctioning EU membership as a contractual relationship between a nation and the 
Union itself. This seems to be self-evident in the case of membership referendums. But it becomes a 
fundamental inequality of EU citizens wheni the issue is reform. Given the unanimity requirement for 
constitutional reform, nationals from some Member States enjoy a greater opportunity to influence or 
even condition EU politics than fellow EU citizens in other Member States. Again, individuals 
legitimate changes of the EU constitutional through their respective national statuses. 
 
III. Social rights and Union Citizenship legitimacy 
Since citizenship is a legal status that establish equality among individuals, it legitimates polity's 
policies aimed to reduce inequalities and, particularly, to reduce theinequalities created by the market. 
The development of social rights, that are an essential component of citizenship entitlements, has been essential to increase the.legitimacy of Western States. Obviously, the market-led logic behind the 
European integration process is bound to create inequalities, although loosers and winners are 
identified along national lines and not as individuals. May Union citizenship become a status 
legitimating Union policies targeting material equalisation among individuals? 
Social rights are conpicuosly absent from the catalogue of citizenship rights listed inarticle 8. Certainly, 
some authors have argued that citizenship rights should not be considered to be reduced to these 
referred as such by the Treaty.16 In fact, a number of entitlements that can be qualified as social fights 
may be identified in EC law, for instance, the entitlement to receive social benefits. However, since 
they have not expressely formulated as citizens rights, their foundation is grounded on individuals ' 
economic activity and not their condition of members of a political entity. They lack, therefore, the 
universalistic character of other citizenship rights, creating instead a two-speed Union citizenship.17 
The fact that certain social fights (mainly, of industrial nature) have been explicitely included in an 
instrument, the Social Protocol, that does not form strictly part of the EU; which is based on an 
intergovernmental agreement and which is not subject to EC law and ECJ jurisdiction does not 
ameliorate this two-speed citizenship. The development of a general character of social citizenship 
rights at the European level has to come, then, through a political decision to activate the dynamic 
charater of citizenship, as enshrined by article 8e. If there seems to be legal grounds to develop certain 
social rights, it may be wondered whether the development of social rights, particularly these with a 
redistributive profile, may be considered a legitimate endeavour of the Union. Several difficulties have 
been signaled. 
Critical (and not so critical) accounts of the process of rights acquistion in a national context have 
underlined the tight relation in the addition of successive layers of rights to the development of the 
market (Marshall and so on). If civic and political rights were the logical correlate to individuals' 
equality introduced by the market, social rights were created as an instrument to modify market logic, 
specifically redistributive rights. Redistribution may found two sources of legitimacy. In the one hand, 
they may be considered necessary to guarantee 
 On the other hand, they can be considered as part of a keynesianist market policy of demand 
stimulation where the satisfaction of individuals needs becomes also an instrument of market 
intervention. Both types responde to what Majone calls, respectively, social regulation, whose purpose 
is to solve problems created by specific types of market failure, and social policy, based in moral or 
political reasons (and not in the search for market efficiency).18 In both cases, the political effect is the 
same: incorporating individuals (and marginalised social groups) to society. 
There seems to be no doubt of the centrality of the market in the development of citizenship fights 
within the EC. The most perfected of these i.e. freedom of movement and residence are tightly linked 
to the creation of the single market of which they are elements that guarantee its efficiency. Whilst this 
market-efficiency argument secures a wide consensus for such fights, the development of a system of 
redistributive social fights is a more contentious argument. The legitimating claim for EU level 
redistributive fights is the possible effects of the market on citizens material status, for instance, the 
increment of unemployment and the constraints on fiscal policy posed by the convergence policies.19 
Thus, in the opinion of the Spanish government, responsibility for the reduction of economic 
disparities has to be assumed by the Union as a prerrequisite of its legitimacy. Economic and social 
cohesion is a political concept that establishes the maximum socially acceptable divergence among 
citizens of the Union.20.The objections to such a development are almost unanimously repeated. 
Firstly and despite neo-Keynesian inspiration behind the Commission White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employment,21 the EU does not have a macroeconomic policy, nor budget or 
fiscal resources to alter the effects of the single market. Secondly, the lack of commonality of the EU 
seems an unsumourtable obstacle for redistributive entitlements. The reference frames for creating or 
eliminating social rights are national cultures and, specifically, the degree of economic welfare that in 
each member state permits granting given social rights. There are, therefore, differences in the way 
different societies may perceive what are the social rights attached to the concept of citizenship or even 
the tendency towards increasing or decreasing this catalog. Whilst some authors signal that the 
backwardness of Southern Member States erodes the basic equality of citizenship in material terms,22 
others have emphasized that the igualatory concept underlying in the principle of social and economic 
cohesion is not the provision of individual entitlements (which would be opposed since it would erode 
competitiveness) but interregional redistribution.23 Effectively, the the objective of social and 
economic cohesion is not even interregional redistribution, but interestatal redistribution.24 Thus, although some authors have argued the development of a Union social policy (and, specifically, 
redistributive rights) can help to produce greater solidarity25 and, in this sense, to create a community, 
it seems however, that solidarity is rather a prerrequiste for developing redistributive social rights. 
These organise solidarity systems but since they serve to compensate different states of necessity 
across time, space and life situations; redistributive rights seem to be part of communities self-
perception and identities.26 For Majone, the delicate value judgements about the appropiate balance of 
efficiency and equity, which social policy express, can only be made legitimately and efficiently within 
homogeneous communities.27 It must be recalled that the development of national welfare states in 
Europe was promoted by a relatively strong perception of common (most male-informed) citizenship, 
molded by identity-shaping experiences such as wars and grounded in an underlying social 
homogeneity.28 
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
The provision of material status for individuals within the EU under the concept of citizenship does not 
seem to have improved EU legitimacy. Nationality, the legal repository of national identity, is still a 
prevalent and more qualified legitimacy source for the EU system and politics. This bring back the 
matter to the problem put forward by classical integration authors: whatever legal status is given to 
individuals, the creation of a European community, in T”nnies' sense, seems to be a prerrequisite for 
legitimasing the polity. 
 